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Cybersecurity: Recognizing the Risk and Protecting 
Against Attacks 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In April 2014, JPMorgan Chase (“JPMorgan”) CEO Jamie 
Dimon warned that even though in 2014 alone the company would 
spend $250 million and assign 1,000 people to addressing cybersecurity 
issues, the protections still may not be enough to protect the company 
from cyberattack.1 Dimon’s fears came to fruition just months later  
when JPMorgan and at least twelve other financial institutions2 became 
victims of a series of coordinated hacking attacks.3 
In the cyberattack on JPMorgan, hackers accessed the bank’s 
network through a JPMorgan employee’s personal computer.4 From 
there, hackers infiltrated the bank’s computer systems and gained access 
to over ninety of the bank’s servers.5 From June to August of 2014, the 
attack went undetected, and hackers accessed JPMorgan’s network 
through a security flaw on one of the bank’s websites.6    Similar to other 
 
1. Doug Carroll, Banks Admit Growing Cyberattack Risks, USA TODAY (Aug. 28, 
2014, 4:06 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/08/28/banks- 
growing-cyber-security-risks/14741653/. 
2. Andy Peters, Morning Scan: Cyberattacks Spread; Geithner and ‘Loan Sharky’, 
AM. BANKER (Oct. 10, 2014, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/morning-scan-cyberattacks-spread-geithner- 
and-loan-sharky-1070431-1.html (“Others in the hackers’ crosshairs may have included 
mutual fund giant Fidelity Investments, online brokerage E*Trade Financial, payroll giant 
Automatic Data Processing and banks Citigroup, Regions Financial and HSBC.”). 
3. Nicole Perlroth, JPMorgan and Other Banks Struck by Hackers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/technology/hackers-target-banks-including- 
jpmorgan.html?_r=0. 
4. Emily Glazer & Danny Yadron, J.P. Morgan Says About 76 Million Households 
Affected by Cyber Breach, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2014, 9:32 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/j-p-morgan-says-about-76-million-households-affected-by- 
cyber-breach-1412283372. 
5. Jessica Silver-Greenberg et al., JPMorgan Chase Hacking Affects 76 Million 
Households, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Oct. 2, 2014, 12:50 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/02/jpmorgan-discovers-further-cyber-security-issues/. 
6. Jordan Robertson & Michael Riley, JPMorgan Hack Said to Span Months via 
Multiple Flaws, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 29, 2014, 8:54 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-29/jpmorgan-hack-said-to-span-months-via- 
multiple-flaws.html. 
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recent attacks, the attack on JPMorgan involved a message that tricked 
customers into clicking on a false link that appeared to be a secure link 
from JPMorgan.7 For over a decade, cybercriminals have  been using 
this technique, known as “phishing,” to steal customers’ identification 
and account information through a fake website or email.8 The 
JPMorgan attack, however, included new technical elements as well.9 
When customers clicked the link, the hackers not only accessed 
JPMorgan’s systems through the fake login page, they also installed 
malware on the users’ computers that could help them hack into other 
institutions.10 
By infiltrating over ninety of JPMorgan’s servers, hackers 
obtained “high-level administrative privileges in the systems” and 
accessed customer accounts.11  The attack on JPMorgan compromised  
or even lost a large number of sensitive data files.12 While no evidence 
existed of fraudulent activity pertaining to the data breach, the 
compromised data consisted of customers’ contact information, 
including names, addresses, phone numbers, and email addresses.13 The 
attack affected an estimated 76 million households and 7 million 
businesses.14 In the months following the attack, regulators and 
prosecutors, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), the 
National Security Agency (“NSA”), the Department of Homeland 
Security (“DHS”), the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Manhattan, and New 
York’s Department of Financial Services (“DFS”), began  to investigate 
 
7. Joseph Steinberg, Why You Are at Risk of Phishing Attacks (and Why JP Morgan 
Chase Customers Were Targeted Last Week), FORBES (Aug. 25, 2014, 8:31 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/josephsteinberg/2014/08/25/why-you-are-at-risk-of-phishing- 
attacks-and-why-jp-morgan-chase-customers-were-targeted-this-week/. 
8. See Avivah Litan & John Pescatore, What to Do Right Now About Phishing, AM. 
BANKER, May 21, 2004, at 11 (defining “phishing” as “using fake e-mails and Web sites to 
steal account and ID information” and suggesting that phishing was a threat to online 
banking in 2004). 
9. Steinberg, supra note 7. 
10. Id. 
11. Nicole Perlroth & Matthew Goldstein, After Breach, JPMorgan Still Seeks to 
Determine Extent of Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/13/technology/after-breach-jpmorgan-still-seeks-to- 
determine-extent-of-attack.html?_r=0. 
12. Michael Riley & Jordan Robertson, FBI Said to Examine Whether Russia Tied to 
JPMorgan        Hacking,        BLOOMBERG (Aug.         27,        2014,       5:04        PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-27/fbi-said-to-be-probing-whether-russia-tied-to- 
jpmorgan-hacking.html. 
13. JPMorgan Chase & Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 2, 2014). 
14. Id. 
  
 
 
2015] CYBERSECURITY 347 
and analyze the breadth of the attack and the motive behind it.15 
While historically regulators only responded to security 
incidents after they occurred, recently regulators at both the federal and 
state level intensified their scrutiny of financial services companies’ 
cybersecurity preparedness.16 The Securities Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) conducted cybersecurity examinations of more than fifty 
broker-dealers   in   2014.17 The    Federal   Financial   Institutions 
Examination Council (“FFIEC”) conducted cybersecurity assessments  
of 500 community banks.18 The State of New York conducted targeted 
cybersecurity preparedness assessments of the banks it regulates.19 
Additionally, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) 
sent letters to roughly twenty broker-dealers seeking information on 
how they manage cybersecurity threats.20 
Federal and state agencies also suggested ways for financial 
institutions to protect against cyberattacks.21 For  example,  in  June 
2013, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) hosted a 
webinar to educate community banks on cybersecurity standards.22 In 
addition, in 2014 the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(“NIST”) created the Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity (“Framework”).23 The Framework aims to help guide 
industries  as  they improve  their cybersecurity efforts24  by  identifying 
 
 
15. Emily Glazer et al., Hackers May Have Targeted at Least 13 Firms, WALL ST. J. 
(Oct. 8, 2014, 9:32 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/citigroup-regions-financial-e-trade- 
adp-saw-traffic-linked-to-j-p-morgan-hackers-1412783395. 
16. Sanford Reback, Financial Industry in the Cyber Crosshairs: BGOV Analysis, 15 
Computer Tech L. Rep. (BNA), No. 16, at 411, 411 (Aug. 15, 2014). 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, In Call to Action, Treasury Secretary 
Lew Urges U.S. Financial Sector To Redouble Efforts Against Cyber Threats (July 16, 
2014), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2571.aspx. 
22. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Holds Web 
Conference for Community Banks on Cyber Threats (June 12, 2013), 
http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2013/nr-occ-2013-96.html. 
23. The NIST Framework is the guidance created in response to Executive Order 
13636. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY 1 (2014), available at 
http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf. The 
Framework is meant to assist organizations in managing cybersecurity risk. Id. 
24. Joe Adler, Banking Groups Hail New Federal Cybersecurity Steps, AM. BANKER, 
Feb. 13, 2014, at 20. 
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best practices for cybersecurity protection and creating a common 
mechanism to evaluate and discuss those practices.25 
Despite regulatory pressure and financial institutions’ efforts to 
protect against security threats, sophisticated cyberattacks against 
financial institutions occur every day, and the resulting costs have 
become part of the business.26 While data breaches and cyberattacks 
were once just a possibility to financial institutions and  other 
businesses, the question has evolved from a matter of “whether” to 
“when.”27 Even with regulators paying more attention to  the 
cyberthreats facing financial institutions,28 the threat to an institution’s 
reputation and the possibility of losing customers’ trust should motivate 
financial institutions to proactively improve their cybersecurity 
infrastructure.29 
As the risk of cyberattacks increases, banks, both large and 
small, should use the newly available guidance to identify weaknesses  
in their infrastructure and develop a proactive security posture.30 This 
Note proceeds in six parts. Part II details the mechanics behind 
cyberattacks.31 Part III identifies the effects of cyberattacks on financial 
institutions.32 Part IV discusses the legal  liability  of  financial 
institutions following a cyberattack.33 Part V evaluates regulatory  
efforts to increase cybersecurity requirements and prevent 
cyberattacks.34 Part VI suggests solutions financial institutions may use 
to   protect   against   cyberattacks.35   Finally,   Part   VII  concludes   by 
 
25. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., supra note 23, at 1. 
26. Mike Snider & Kevin Johnson, New Cyberattack on Banks ‘Very Sophisticated’, 
USA TODAY (Aug. 28, 2014), 7:55 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/08/28/jpmorgan-chase-bank 
hack/14730183/. 
27. Elizabeth E. McGinn et al., The Board of Directors and Cybersecurity: Setting up 
the Right Structure, 103 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 458, 458 (Aug. 26, 2014). 
28. Rachel Witkowski, Policymakers Preaching About Cybersecurity, But Are Banks 
Listening?, AM. BANKER, July 1, 2013, at 7. 
29. Jackie Stewart, Cybersecurity Threats Demand Small-Bank Directors’ Attention, 
AM. BANKER, Aug. 27, 2014, at 4. 
30. Earl Crane, Cybersecurity Framework Can Help Banks Address Increased 
Regulatory Scrutiny, AM. BANKER (Feb. 26, 2014, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/cybersecurity-framework-can-help-banks- 
address-regulatory-scrutiny-1065839-1.html. 
31. See infra Part II. 
32. See infra Part III. 
33. See infra Part IV. 
34. See infra Part V. 
35. See infra Part VI. 
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emphasizing the importance of financial institutions using the available 
guidance to make sure that their networks are sufficiently protected.36 
II. HOW CYBERATTACKS OCCUR 
 
Cybercriminals can access computer systems and business 
networks in a variety of ways.37 The most common methods include 
phishing, malware, and accessing the unsecure networks of third-party 
vendors.38 
 
A. Phishing 
 
Phishing is when a cybercriminal sends an email, text, or pop-up 
message asking for personal or financial information.39 A phishing 
message may say something like, “We suspect an unauthorized 
transaction on your account. To ensure that your account is not 
compromised, please click the link below and confirm your identity.”40 
The goal of a phishing message is to deceive the recipient into believing 
that the message comes from a legitimate business and entering  
personal information based on their belief.41 Once the  recipient  
provides the information, the hacker can then use the information to 
commit fraud.42 The attack on JPMorgan included a phishing campaign 
targeting JPMorgan customers.43 JPMorgan customers received emails 
that appeared to be from JPMorgan instructing the recipient to click a 
link.44 Once a recipient clicked on the link, the security of the user’s 
computer was compromised.45 
 
36. See infra Part VII. 
37. KASPERSKY LAB, GLOBAL IT SECURITY RISKS 2014 – ONLINE FINANCIAL FRAUD 
PREVENTION 1, 10 (2014), available at 
http://media.kaspersky.com/en/IT_Security_Risks_Survey_2014_Financial_Security_report. 
pdf?_ga=1.34870177.1093389152.1412952265. 
38. Id. 
39. Phishing, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Sept. 2011), http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/ 
0003-phishing. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Smash & Grab Campaign Targets JP Morgan Chase Customers, PROOFPOINT, 
http://www.proofpoint.com/threatinsight/posts/smash-and-grab-jpmorgan.php (last visited 
Jan. 8, 2015). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
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B. Malware 
 
After phishing compromises a user’s computer, cybercriminals 
can install malware.46 Cybercriminals can install malware, short for 
“malicious software,” on computers, smart phones, or other mobile 
devices without the owner’s consent.47 Once malware is installed, 
cybercriminals can monitor and control online activity, steal  
confidential information, and commit fraud.48 In the JPMorgan attack, 
after a customer clicked the phishing link, the hackers installed malware 
on the user’s computer.49 By installing the malware, hackers accessed 
JPMorgan’s computer network, including servers that contained 
customers’ personal information.50 
 
C. Third-Party Vendors 
 
Financial institutions often use third-party vendors such as law 
firms, accounting firms, marketing firms, maintenance companies, and 
janitorial companies for necessary services.51 Some of these third 
parties’ security practices are remiss or even nonexistent.52 As a result, 
even if cybercriminals cannot directly breach a financial institution’s 
network, they may still gain access to the institution’s network through 
the network of a third-party vendor.53 For example, in the 2013 attack  
on Target (“Target Breach”), cybercriminals accessed Target’s  
computer system through the security system of a heating and cooling 
contractor who was working for Target.54 Once the cybercriminals 
accessed Target’s network through the third-party vendor, they were 
able to install malware on the company’s computer servers and steal 
 
46. Malware, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Feb. 2014), http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/ 
0011-malware. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Smash & Grab Campaign Targets JP Morgan Chase Customers, supra note 43. 
50. Glazer & Yadron, supra note 4. 
51. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Matthew Goldstein, After JPMorgan Chase Breach, 
Push to Close Wall St. Security Gaps, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Oct. 21, 2014, 4:57 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/21/after-jpmorgan-cyberattack-a-push-to-fortify-wall- 
street-banks/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0. 
52. See id. (“In attack after attack, hackers are rebuffed by financial institutions, only  
to slip through the cracks at vendors, including some that have virtually no security.”). 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
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confidential credit and debit card data as well as Target customers’ 
personal information.55 
III. EFFECT OF CYBERATTACKS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
When a data breach occurs, the cost falls onto American 
consumers and their financial institutions.56 Depending on the size of  
the breached company, the cost of a single data breach can range 
anywhere from $66,000 to $938,000 per organization.57 The cost of a 
breach includes actual fraud losses, the price of reissuing cards, loss of 
customers, the burden on customer service, and fees paid to consultants 
and lawyers who banks hire to manage the problem.58 Another cost for 
the breached institution, though difficult to quantify, involves the strain 
put on employees’ productivity following a data breach. 59 
The National Association of Federal Credit Unions estimated 
that the 2013 Target Breach60 cost the financial institutions of affected 
customers a combined $480 million in fraud loss, reimbursement costs, 
card replacement costs, operational costs, and other associated 
expenses.61 After the Target Breach, an American Bankers Association 
survey found  that  the  loss  per  fraudulently used  debit  card averaged 
$331 while the loss per credit card was $530.62 Customers are not liable 
for  paying these  fraudulent  charges  and reissue costs.63 Instead, the 
 
55. Elizabeth A. Harris et al., A Sneaky Path into Target Customers’ Wallets, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2014, at A1. 
56. Carrie Hunt, Retailers Should Be Held to Stricter Standards on Data Security, AM. 
BANKER (Aug. 27, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/retailers- 
should-be-held-to-stricter-standards-on-data-security-1069613-1.html. 
57. The cost depends on the size of the institution. Penny Crosman, How Much Do 
Data Breaches Cost? Two Studies Attempt a Tally, AM. BANKER, Sept. 12, 2014, at 4. The 
smaller amount corresponds to smaller institutions and the bigger amount corresponds to 
larger institutions. Id. However, larger institutions tend to have economies of scale that 
make the cost per customer lower for larger institutions than for smaller institutions. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. The Target Breach began “with a malware-laced email phishing attack sent to 
employees at an HVAC firm” that Target used as a third-party vendor. Target Hackers 
Broke in Via HVAC Company, KREBS ON SEC. (Feb. 5, 2014, 1:52 PM), 
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/02/target-hackers-broke-in-via-hvac-company/. 
61. Hunt, supra note 56. 
62. AM. BANKERS ASS’N, TARGET BREACH IMPACT SURVEY 10 (July 2014), available at 
http://www.aba.com/Tools/Function/Payments/Documents/TargetBreachBankImpact.pdf. 
63. Press Release, Target, Target Provides Update on Data Breach and Financial 
Performance (Jan. 10, 2014), http://pressroom.target.com/news/target-provides-update-on- 
data-breach-and-financial-performance. 
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burden falls on banks to pay the costs and then seek reimbursement  
from merchants.64 
Reissuing debit and credit cards following a data breach also 
creates expenses for banks.65 For large banks,66 reissuing a new debit 
card costs  about  $2.70  while reissuing a  new  credit  card costs  about 
$2.99.67 For small banks,68 however, reissuing a new debit card costs 
about $11 while reissuing a new credit card costs about $12.75.69 Small 
banks incur higher costs because they must reissue all potentially 
affected cards as a precaution, whereas large banks have resources such 
as contact centers that can actively monitor potentially affected cards 
and reissue only those that are fraudulently used.70 In addition, large 
banks’ economies of scale help lower the per-unit cost of replacing each 
fraudulently used card.71 
Even when banks receive reimbursement from a merchant 
following a breach, the amount reimbursed usually does not cover the 
total cost of the breach, including card reissuance and fraud loss.72 In 
breaches that occurred between 2009 and 2014, less than 34% of all 
banks received any amount of reimbursement; 100% of large banks 
received at least some reimbursement following a data  breach, 
compared to only 25% of small banks.73 Even still, the majority of  
banks that received any sort of reimbursement received less than ten 
cents per dollar, and even worse, almost 50% of banks received less 
than one cent per dollar.74 
Breaches  also  impact  consumers.75 When  a  breach  occurs, 
 
64. Lawrence Delevingne, Banks May Take Their Pound of Flesh from Target over 
Breach, NBC NEWS (Dec. 23, 2013, 3:19 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/business- 
news/banks-may-take-their-pound-flesh-target-over-breach-f2D11794859. 
65. AM. BANKERS ASS’N, supra note 62, at 5–16. 
66. For purposes of the study, large banks were defined as banks with more than $50 
billion in assets.  Id. at 6. 
67. Id. at 11. 
68. Small banks were defined as banks with less than $1 billion in assets.  Id. at 6. 
69. Id. at 11. (“Included are costs for mailing, card stock, and additional staff  
resources, etc. Because many respondents were unable to track additional staff time spent to 
respond to customer inquiries and to monitor and prevent fraud related to the Target breach, 
the reissue costs reported here are conservative, baseline figures.”). 
70. Crosman, supra note 57. 
71. Id. 
72. AM. BANKERS ASS’N, supra note 62, at 20. 
73.    Id. at 18–19. 
74.    Id. at 21. 
75.    Id. at 13–14. 
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customers, especially those who possess only one card, are 
inconvenienced when they must wait for a replacement card before they 
can make purchases.76 Additionally, following a breach, customers face 
an increased risk of fraud and future identity theft.77 Thus, a company’s 
failure to protect against a data breach results in lost business, which 
could ultimately negatively affect the company’s valuation.78 
A financial institution’s data breach may result in a loss of both 
individual and business customers.79 Although customers do not always 
cite a data breach as their reason for leaving a bank,80 research 
conducted by SafeNet, Inc. found that 80% of individual customers  
were at least somewhat unlikely to do business with a company that 
experienced a data breach of financial information.81 Further, a study 
conducted by the Kaspersky Lab found that 60% of personal customers 
opted for an online store or financial services provider that offers 
safeguards for protecting financial information, and 75% of customers 
would prefer to have all of their devices protected by their banks against 
online financial fraud.82 Similarly, a separate study conducted by the 
Kaspersky Lab concluded that almost half of businesses changed banks 
after security breaches compromised their accounts.83 Of the businesses 
surveyed, 82% admitted that they would consider leaving a bank that 
suffered a breach.84 Thus, data breaches cause customers to lose trust in 
breached companies.85 
Following a breach, the biggest cost to financial institutions is 
arguably the burden on customer service.86   Within twenty-four hours of 
 
76. Id. 
77. Letter from Tim Pawlenty, President and CEO, Fin. Servs. Roundtable, to  
Members of Congress (Jan. 27, 2014), available at http://fsroundtable.org/open-letter- 
congress-cybersecurity-01-27-14/. 
78. Global Survey Reveals Impact of Data Breaches on Customer Loyalty, SAFENET, 
http://www2.safenet-inc.com/email/2014/dp/GlobalCustomerSentiment/index.html#1918 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2015). 
79. Crosman, supra note 57. 
80. Id. 
81. Global Survey, supra note 78. 
82. KASPERSKY LAB, CONSUMER SECURITY RISKS SURVEY 2014: MULTI-DEVICE 
THREATS IN A MULTI-DEVICE WORLD 22 (July 2014), available at 
http://media.kaspersky.com/en/Kaspersky_Lab_Consumer_Security_Risks_Survey_2014_E 
NG.pdf. 
83. Crosman, supra note 57. 
84. Global IT Security Risks 2014, supra note 37, at 14. 
85. Global Survey, supra note 78. 
86. Crosman, supra note 57. 
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learning of a breach, some banks begin calling customers to notify 
them.87 While some banks use third-party vendors to handle these calls 
at call centers, at some small and mid-size banks, the burden falls on 
bank employees.88   Each of these customer service calls can cost up to 
$20.89 Even for banks that use third-party vendors, each call can cost as 
much as replacing the card.90 In addition to calls, banks also draft and 
send letters to customers regarding the breach.91 If customers become 
aware of the breach by the media or other outside sources, they will call 
the bank inquiring about unauthorized transactions or requesting a new 
card.92 When breaches occur, bank employees and call centers can 
become overwhelmed, which may hinder the bank’s normal operations 
and its customer service center’s ability to provide assistance.93 After  
the Target Breach, for example, at least one bank reported that 
employees were removed from performing their usual duties to assist 
with customer service and notification procedures.94 Following a  
breach, employees may get fired, and, in the most severe instances, the 
morale of an organization may never recover.95 
IV. POTENTIAL LEGAL LIABILITY OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
FOLLOWING A CYBERATTACK 
 
When a data breach occurs, companies can expect lawsuits for 
negligence, breach of contract, and violation of state laws including 
deceptive trade practices acts or data breach notification laws.96 These 
suits can also result in personal liability for the directors of the bank.97 
When a cybersecurity breach harms customers, affected 
customers may likely bring negligence  claims against  the  institution.98 
 
87. AM. BANKERS ASS’N, supra note 62, at 14. 
88.    Id. at 13–14. 
89. Crosman, supra note 57. 
90. As a reminder, the cost to reissue a card can range from $2.70 to $12.75 per 
customer.  AM. BANKERS ASS’N, supra note 62, at 14. 
91. Id. at 13. 
92. Id. at 14. 
93. Crosman, supra note 57. 
94. AM. BANKERS ASS’N, supra note 62, at 13. 
95. Crosman, supra note 57. 
96. Kimberly Peretti, Cyber Threat Intelligence: To Share or Not to Share—What Are 
the Real Concerns, Banking Daily (BNA), Issue No. 173 (Sept. 8, 2014). 
97. McGinn et al., supra note 27, at 461. 
98. Joe Adler, Why Obama’s ‘Voluntary’ Cybersecurity Plan May Prove Mandatory, 
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After a Home Depot data breach in 2014 compromised the personal 
information of 56 million customers, the company faced at least fifteen 
lawsuits alleging that Home Depot acted negligently by failing to 
adequately secure the customers’ personal and financial information.99 
When faced with negligence claims, institutions must show that their 
cybersecurity procedures are “commercially reasonable.”100 The 
reasonableness standard is subjective, and although the Framework is 
not a requirement for institutions, courts are likely to use it to determine 
reasonable industry practices.101 Thus, if an institution’s cybersecurity 
practices do not align with the Framework, the institution must prove 
that its practices are nevertheless reasonable.102 
Financial institutions may also face breach of contract suits in 
which customers allege that the institution contractually promised to 
protect the customer’s personal information and then breached that 
promise.103 In a class action lawsuit against eBay in 2014, plaintiffs 
alleged breach of contract based on the terms of the company’s privacy 
policy, as well as breach of implied contract based on customers’ 
disclosure of information in reliance on the company’s stated privacy 
policy to protect against data breaches.104 At least one court held that a 
company’s privacy policy or other statements made by the company 
assuring the security of customers’ data does not constitute a contractual 
promise to safeguard data.105  However, another court recognized that  
an implied contractual relationship may exist when a customer uses a 
credit or debit card at a company and expects that the company will 
protect  its  personal  information.106      Because  of  this  undecided legal 
 
 
AM. BANKER, Feb. 18, 2014, at 15. 
99. Amanda Bronstad, Lawsuits Piling Up in Home Depot Data Security Breach, THE 
NAT’L    L.   J.   (Sept.   25,   2014),  http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202671405651 
/Lawsuits-Piling-Up-in-Home-Depot-Data-Security-Breach. 
100. Adler, supra note 98. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. DOUGLAS H. MEAL & DAVID T. COHEN, PRIVATE DATA SECURITY BREACH 
LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES, in PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE LEGAL ISSUES: LEADING 
LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING CHANGES IN SECURITY PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS AND HELPING 
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issue, customers may continue to allege both express and implied  
breach of contract claims when companies fail to reasonably protect 
customers’ private information.107 
When data breaches violate state laws, both the company as a 
whole and individual board members may be held liable108 under 
deceptive trade practice acts and data  breach  notification  statutes.109 
For example, when First National Bank of Nebraska refused to refund 
fees for unauthorized purchases following a data breach, the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Nebraska held that the bank’s  
customers had a claim under Nebraska’s Uniform Deceptive Trade 
Practices Act.110 Additionally, almost all states have enacted security 
breach notification statutes that the state’s attorney general can use to 
bring lawsuits against companies that fail to protect against 
cyberattacks.111 Absent a federal data breach notification  law, 
companies must comply with the requirements of state data breach 
notification statutes, which sometimes contradict each other.112 Ten 
states, including North Carolina,113 have statutes that explicitly allow 
private rights of action in addition to potential suits brought by the state 
attorney general.114 Thus, after a breach, a single company may face 
many lawsuits for noncompliance with data breach notification 
statutes.115 
Finally, when a cyberattack results in a drop in a public 
company’s share price, shareholders may bring derivative suits against 
the company if it failed to adequately protect against cyberattacks.116 
When   breaches   compromise   sensitive   information,   customers lose 
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confidence and some may change providers.117 As a result of this 
reputational damage, stock prices may drop and shareholders may  
sue.118 OCC officials have warned that in order to avoid potential 
company and personal liability, bank boards of directors and managers 
must maintain adequate cybersecurity policies and practices at their 
institutions.119 Boards of directors and managers should be involved in 
and regularly briefed about the company’s cybersecurity efforts to avoid 
becoming an easy target for such derivative suits.120 
V. FEDERAL AND STATE EFFORTS TO INCREASE CYBERSECURITY 
REQUIREMENTS AND PREVENT CYBERATTACKS 
 
As cybersecurity has become increasingly important to the 
financial industry, government officials and agencies are instituting 
requirements and providing guidance to help improve cybersecurity 
policies and protect against future attacks.121 
 
A. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
 
Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”) Safeguards 
Rule, financial institutions122 have an affirmative duty to protect 
consumers’ personal information.123 Specifically, “each financial 
institution has an affirmative and continuing obligation to respect the 
privacy of its customers and to protect the security and confidentiality  
of those customers’ non-public personal information.”124 Financial 
institutions must “establish appropriate standards . . . relating to 
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to insure the security 
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and confidentiality of customer records  and  information.”125  In 
addition, they are required “to protect against any anticipated threats or 
hazards to the security or integrity of such records; and to  protect 
against unauthorized access to or use of such records or information 
which could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any 
customer.”126 To comply with GLBA’s requirements, financial 
institutions must “develop, implement, and maintain a comprehensive 
information security program that . . . contains administrative, technical, 
and physical safeguards that are appropriate to [the institution’s] size 
and complexity, the nature and scope of [the institution’s] activities, and 
the sensitivity of any customer information at issue.”127 Some states  
have enacted legislation that extends the Safeguards Rule to state 
chartered banks as well.128 A financial institution’s failure to comply 
with the Safeguards Rule may result in charges by the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) and significant monetary and reputational 
damages.129 
 
B. Proposed Legislation: Cyberintelligence Sharing and 
Protection Act (“CISPA”) and National Cybersecurity and 
Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2013 
 
Over the last five years, almost 100 bills regarding cybersecurity 
have been introduced in Congress.130 None of this proposed legislation, 
however, has been enacted into law.131 While advocates of these bills 
stressed a need for information sharing to strengthen the security of 
computer networks, opponents, such as the American Civil Liberties 
Union (“ACLU”) and other privacy advocates, feared that the bills did 
not adequately protect Americans’ private information.132 
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These efforts demonstrate that lawmakers recognize that issues 
such as cybersecurity and protection against cyberthreats require 
legislation, however nothing has yet been adopted.133 Since 2013, the 
House of Representatives has advanced two bills regarding 
cybersecurity: the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act 
(“CISPA”),134 which failed, and the National Cybersecurity and Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Act (“NCCIP Act”),135 which was approved by 
the Senate as the National Cybersecurity Protection Act in December 
2014.136 The House of Representatives passed CISPA on April 18, 
2013.137 CISPA intended “[t]o provide for the sharing of certain 
[cyberthreat] intelligence and [cyberthreat] information between the 
intelligence community and cybersecurity entities.”138 However, due to 
privacy concerns over proposed exceptions to existing privacy laws, the 
bill was not seriously considered in the Senate.139 
Over a year later, in July 2014, the House of Representatives 
approved the NCCIP Act,140 a bill that lays out security standards for 
federal government systems and private-sector business considered 
critical to the economy.141 Most importantly, the NCCIP Act differs  
from CISPA in that it does not create exceptions to existing privacy 
laws.142   Because of this change, some who opposed the CISPA, such as 
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the ACLU, endorsed the NCCIP Act.143 On July 29, 2014, the bill was 
referred to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs.144 If passed, this  Act  could  significantly 
improve cybersecurity by creating the National Cybersecurity and 
Communications Integration Center (“NCCIC”) to facilitate real-time 
cyberthreat information-sharing across critical infrastructure  sectors.145 
It would also establish an equal partnership between private industry 
and the DHS to facilitate critical infrastructure protection and incident 
response following a cyberattack.146 
 
C. NIST Guidance 
 
As legislative attempts failed, in February 2013, President 
Obama issued Executive Order 13636 “to improve cybersecurity 
information sharing and collaboratively develop and implement risk- 
based standards.”147 The Executive Order directed the NIST to create a 
framework to reduce cyberrisks to the nation’s critical infrastructure.148 
The Executive Order set out to strengthen the protections of critical 
infrastructure against threats of cyberattack by developing industry best 
practices.149 The Order aimed to create a voluntary program to 
encourage financial firms, utility operators, and others who own and/or 
operate critical infrastructure to share information with one another 
about cyberthreats.150 The voluntary program intended to promote 
standards that would reduce the risk of cybersecurity threats on facilities 
vital to national security, the economy, or public health.151 
After a yearlong process, the NIST created the Framework as a 
compilation of industry best practices for managing cybersecurity 
risks.152   The NIST designed the Framework to complement, rather than 
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replace, an organization’s existing cybersecurity  program.153  
Ultimately, the Framework aims to assist organizations, regardless of 
size, degree of risk, or level of cybersecurity sophistication, in reducing 
and better managing their cybersecurity risks.154 
By establishing a set of best practices, the Framework aspires to 
help financial institutions and other businesses set and reach their 
cybersecurity risk management goals in a cost-effective way, but 
without the increased burden of regulation.155 While not mandatory, the 
Framework reflects current regulations and best practices of the 
financial industry and also provides guidance on how cybersecurity 
practices can be improved.156 Regulators will likely use the Framework 
as a baseline when conducting future examinations and when updating 
their own examination procedures and guidance.157 
 
D. OCC Guidance 
 
The OCC’s June 2013 Semiannual Risk Perspective devoted an 
entire section to addressing cyberthreats to banks of all sizes.158 The 
report suggested that hackers might increasingly target smaller 
institutions that they believe lack the resources necessary to protect 
against cyberattacks.159 Nevertheless, the report still identified the 
increasing volume and sophistication of cyberthreats as a key risk to 
large banks.160 Recognizing cyberthreats as “the fastest-growing risk to 
banks,” the OCC acknowledged that regulators currently think more in 
terms of supervision than in terms of regulation.161 
The  focus of the OCC policies and supervision will  vary based 
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on the size of the banks.162  For example, for small to mid-size banks,  
the focus centers on strategic and capital planning, whereas for large 
banks, the focus remains “on strengthening their governance, oversight 
and operational risk issues.”163 Specifically, for large banks, the OCC 
supervisory staff will review an institution’s existing threat assessment 
and incident response programs as well as conduct vulnerability 
assessments.164 The OCC also noted that the pace of new regulatory 
requirements can cause increased risks for banks that do not adequately 
invest in cybersecurity.165 
In addition to the Risk Perspective, the OCC hosted a webinar, 
attended by approximately 1,000 bankers, offering a basic course on 
cybersecurity policies and procedures.166 The OCC explained that a 
bank’s cybersecurity program should be integrated as part of its 
information security and vendor management processes.167 The OCC 
also stressed that in order to adequately address evolving threats, a 
bank’s cybersecurity policies and practices must be monitored and 
adjusted regularly.168 
 
E. DFS Cybersecurity Assessments169 
 
In response to the growing risk of cyberattacks against financial 
institutions, the New York DFS conducted an industry-wide survey on 
cybersecurity practices.170 After completion of the survey in May 2014, 
New York Governor Andrew Cuomo announced that because of the 
growing risk of cyberattacks on New York banks, the DFS would begin 
conducting targeted cybersecurity assessments to assist banks in 
safeguarding   personal   bank    records   and    protecting   banks   from 
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cyberbreaches.171 The new examinations will include  questions 
regarding IT management and governance, incident response, network 
security, vendor management, and disaster recovery.172 The DFS will 
conduct the examinations on financial institutions, including state- 
chartered banks, credit unions, and foreign banks whose U.S. 
headquarters are located in New York.173 Each institution  will  be 
graded on its cybersecurity readiness.174 Through the examinations, the 
DFS aims to support banks and help improve cybersecurity by 
encouraging banks to focus on their cybersecurity preparedness.175 DFS 
serves as the first regulator to begin conducting regular, targeted 
cybersecurity preparedness assessments of the banks it regulates.176 
 
F. FFIEC Guidance and Cybersecurity Assessments 
 
In April 2014, FFIEC members177 issued a statement notifying 
financial institutions of potential cyberattack risks and describing the 
steps institutions should take to address the attacks.178 Then, in May 
2014, the FFIEC announced plans to conduct cybersecurity risk 
assessments of community banks179 to highlight areas for financial 
institution managers and directors to focus on to mitigate cybersecurity 
risks.180         These   focus   areas   include   building   a   security culture, 
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identifying and monitoring risks, developing risk management 
processes, creating awareness and accountability, and ensuring reports  
to management about the institution’s potential vulnerability.181 The 
assessments also include examinations of the policies that community 
banks currently use to detect vulnerability and protect against risks.182 
The  reviews focus on  five  key areas of cybersecurity  preparedness:183 
(1) risk management and oversight; (2) threat intelligence and 
collaboration; (3) cybersecurity controls; (4) external dependency 
management; and (5) incident management and resilience.184 
Like the Framework, the FFIEC Cybersecurity Assessment does 
not create new requirements for financial institutions.185 Instead of 
functioning as a standalone test, the program is designed to be 
incorporated into the already-existing community bank examinations 
and to assist the relevant federal regulators in developing a baseline 
assessment of how banks manage cyberrisks.186 The assessments are 
primarily meant to assist authorities in examining cybersecurity 
preparedness programs at small and mid-size banks that do not have 
access to all of the resources available to big banks.187  The FFIEC’s  
goal in conducting the assessments is to make sure that regulated 
financial institutions adequately manage cybersecurity risks based on 
their complexity and risk profile.188 The assessment’s identification of 
gaps in cybersecurity practices will help the FFIEC make informed 
decisions about future actions189 and assist supervisors and regulators in 
making informed decisions to protect against cyberrisks.190  
Additionally, the assessments are designed to help FFIEC member 
institutions learn about the state of cybersecurity across community 
institutions and prioritize actions that should be taken.191    Bank boards 
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and management should embrace these assessments as ways to identify 
gaps in current practices and prepare their institution for the possibility 
of a cyberattack.192 
FFIEC agencies conducted its first Cybersecurity Assessments 
on 500 community banks during the summer of 2014.193 Overall, the 
assessments found that while the level of risk varies greatly across the 
financial industry, understanding the threats and  techniques attackers 
use will help management identify, assess, and mitigate each financial 
institution’s specific risks.194 For example, institutions that grant 
employees access to the bank’s network from their personal devices risk 
exposing their financial institution to malware.195 The assessments also 
found that most financial institutions understand the need to educate 
employees about cybersecurity risk management, maintain event logs to 
understand a cyberattack after it occurs, have a process  for 
implementing corrective controls to address previously identified 
vulnerabilities, and have disaster recovery plans for when incidents 
occur.196 As a result of the Assessments’ findings,  FFIEC members  
must review and update current guidance to financial institutions to 
align it with the changing cybersecurity risk.197 
In addition to the Assessments, a webpage launched by the 
FFIEC in June 2014 offers further guidance and features information 
about the Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Working Group 
created in June 2013, a handbook about the FFIEC examinations, and a 
May 2014 webinar and video on cybersecurity for community bank 
CEOs.198 These resources endeavor to assist managers and directors in 
understanding expectations, assessing the risks of their institution, and 
mitigating against those risks.199 
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VI. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS 
 
While financial institutions continue to develop strategies to 
identify and protect against cybersecurity risks, still more  can be  done 
to mitigate the risks.200 People, whether consumers or employees, often 
serve as the weak link in security.201 For example, in the JPMorgan 
breach, hackers used the personal computer of an employee who was 
working from home to access the bank’s network.202 Similarly, in the 
Target Breach, hackers breached Target’s system using credentials 
stolen from an employee of the company’s vendor.203 
Educating employees and consumers on how to distinguish 
legitimate entities from fraudulent ones is key to protecting against 
phishing attacks.204 For example, financial institutions should educate 
customers about the possible consequences of clicking on links or 
opening attachments in unsolicited emails.205 To prevent customers  
from becoming a victim to these emails, financial institutions should 
teach their customers that banks and merchants will never ask for 
personal or financial information via email.206 In addition, financial 
institutions should instruct customers that if they receive emails or 
phone calls from someone claiming to work for their bank, they should 
contact the bank directly to find out whether the institution actually 
requested the information.207 Despite the fact that the Target Breach 
occurred through a third-party vendor, Target, recognizing the risk and 
the importance of customer education, announced plans to launch a $5 
million, multiyear campaign to educate customers about cybersecurity 
risks, including the dangers of phishing scams.208 
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One resource available for customer education is the FTC’s 
Consumer Information website that provides “Examples of Phishing 
Messages,” “How to Deal with Phishing Scams,” and “Action Steps” to 
avoid a phishing attack.209  The website advises consumers to neither   
not reply to online solicitations that ask for personal or financial 
information nor click on any links within those solicitations, even  if 
they appear to be from an organization they trust.210 As part of an effort 
to educate consumers, financial institutions should direct their  
customers to these resources, develop their own informational material, 
or even consider a campaign similar to Target’s to disseminate the 
information.211 
Financial institutions should also focus on educating and  
training employees.212 Although the majority of financial institutions 
already train employees on cybersecurity, the benefits of such training 
increase when updated regularly and provided routinely.213 Financial 
institutions should constantly provide employee security training, 214  
and should regularly remind employees of what they should look for 
with respect to security threats.215 An annual reminder to employees to 
be vigilant is no longer sufficient.216 Instead, employees should be 
reminded about the importance of security every time they log into the 
system, such as through a pop-up notification requiring the user’s 
acknowledgement before proceeding.217 At the very least, management 
should brief employees about security concerns on a quarterly basis.218 
Financial institutions should present information about cyberrisks in 
layman’s terms so that the financial institution’s board of directors and 
team members will understand what needs to occur to properly protect 
against risk.219 
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Financial institutions should establish programs to continuously 
monitor network activity to ensure that security compromises do not go 
undetected or unquestioned.220 In monitoring network activity, banks 
should collect enough information about typical network activity so that 
red flags will go up if a user abnormally accesses information 
throughout the organization.221 At a minimum, the institution’s board of 
directors or board of trustees should make sure that their institutions run 
adequate tests on their security systems and review their security  
policies annually.222 In addition, the most secure system should require 
employees to present a thumbprint or facial scan as evidence of their 
identity for authentication before accessing the network.223 Finally, 
employees’ access to data and programs should be limited, allowing 
them access only to the information that is essential for them to perform 
their job functions.224 
At many institutions, directors wait until the financial institution 
suffers a cyberattack or attacks are otherwise widely reported to discuss 
cybersecurity with management.225 However, routine discussions in 
board and management meetings about cybersecurity issues would 
strengthen risk management by building a security culture within the 
institution.226 Although not mandatory, institutions should use the 
Framework to assess their cybersecurity risk management and help 
identify issues that may invite regulatory scrutiny.227 After conducting 
the assessment, directors and management, particularly audit and risk 
committees, should be briefed on the results.228 
Financial institutions should also develop a protocol to notify 
customers as soon as possible after detection of a breach.229 In May 
2014, the White House released a report encouraging banks to inform 
Americans when their information has been compromised or stolen.230 
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The report recommended that Congress “pass legislation that provides 
for a national data breach standard” and imposes a reasonable time 
period for organizations to provide such notification.231 After a 
cyberattack occurs, banks must disclose232 to customers that customer 
data has been breached.233 But this process can take days or even 
weeks.234 Oftentimes, financial institutions and companies like Target  
do not immediately know what information is compromised or who is 
affected.235 Cybercriminals will take advantage  of these days or weeks 
of uncertainty by initiating a series of identity-theft scams.236 Such 
scams often include emails to customers in which criminals pretend to 
be the financial institution whose security was  compromised.237 
Nervous consumers who believe the emails often divulge the requested 
information and become victims of identity theft.238 
A financial institution’s delay in disclosing a breach can end up 
making the hacker’s attempts more successful by allowing  these 
nervous customers to become more at risk for identity  theft.239  
Financial institutions should have procedures in place for notifying 
customers, regulators, and law enforcement when a cyberattack 
occurs.240 Documentation    of    such    procedures  ensures   timely 
notification and to assist in prompt decision-making in the event of a 
cyberattack.241 
Third-party vendors also make financial institutions vulnerable 
to  cyberattacks.242     Institutions  must  examine  their relationships with 
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these parties to identify all potential risks.243 For this reason, regulators 
now encourage banks to increase their oversight of third-party 
vendors.244 As “banks increasingly rely on third-party vendors,” outside 
vendors are gaining access to large amounts of sensitive data.245 Some 
small-market firms outsource all of their information technology 
functions to third-party providers.246 While financial institutions can 
outsource these functions, they cannot outsource the  risk.247 
Outsourcing requires institutions to understand how risks are managed, 
and banks must have a response plan implemented in the event that data 
is lost or a cyberattack occurs.248 
In addition to a bank’s cyberattack response plan, institutions 
that use third-party vendors should ensure that any vendor they use has  
a plan in place to respond to a cyberthreat.249 Therefore, before entering 
into a contract, management should consider the potential risks in the 
third-party’s systems and evaluate the third-party’s cybersecurity 
practices.250 Financial institutions should also ensure that contracts with 
third parties protect the bank if a security breach occurs as a result of  
the relationship with the third-party.251 Financial institutions of all sizes 
should use the Framework to convey cybersecurity risk management 
requirements to all third-parties with which they work, including 
providers of critical systems on which the institutions depend.252 Using 
the Framework may help financial institutions avoid legal liability for 
negligence related to third-party relationships.253 
With cybersecurity incidents occurring more frequently, 
financial institutions should obtain cyberinsurance coverage to help pay 
the potentially massive costs that result from a data breach.254  While 
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general insurance policies may not sufficiently cover data breaches, 
additional stand-alone cyberinsurance plans are tailored to cover the 
costs of a security breach including lost income, operating expenses,  
and costs that arise arising out of third-party claims.255 In addition, 
stand-alone cyberinsurance policies can provide coverage for both first- 
party losses and third-party liability.256 Cyberinsurance policies may 
cover a variety of costs associated with a data breach, such as legal and 
investigative fees, crisis management costs, and losses due to business 
interruption.257 Over 60% of risk management professionals whose 
company has obtained a cyberinsurance policy believe that having the 
insurance has improved their preparedness for handling cyberrisks.258 
However, companies purchasing cyberinsurance should consider that 
some policies require that legal representation come from a pre-selected 
panel of attorneys, so the company may not be permitted to obtain top- 
notch counsel should a cyberattack occur.259 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
The recent attack on JPMorgan highlighted the importance of 
maintaining adequate cybersecurity practices for  financial 
institutions.260 Today, financial institutions, no matter the size,  are 
almost certain to experience some type of cyberattack.261 These attacks 
may occur through phishing, malware, or the unsecure networks of 
third-party vendors.262 If successful, a single attack can cost an 
institution hundreds of thousands of dollars in fraud losses and other 
expenses.263    It may also result in a loss of customers264  and potential 
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lawsuits.265 In response to the growing risk of cyberattacks, government 
officials and agencies have developed assessments and other guidelines 
to assist companies in protecting against the risk.266 Financial  
institutions should use the newly available guidance to evaluate their 
cybersecurity practices, identify weaknesses, and ensure that their 
networks are adequately protected.267 
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